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GRAAT On-Line - Book Reviews
Miloš Kovic, Disraeli
and the Eastern Question (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
UK £ 60 (hardback), 68,09 €, 339 pages, ISBN 978-0-19-957460-5—Stéphanie
Prévost, Université François Rabelais, Tours.
Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881), who, early in his political career,
had acknowledged: ‘I love fame; I love public reputation; I
love to live in the eyes of the country’, would surely have
revelled in being the subject of yet another political biography.
All the more so as in his thorough study entitled Disraeli and
the Eastern Question, Miloš Kovic seeks to explain the views
on the Eastern Question of the twice Premier, Anglican Conservative
leader of Jewish ascent and novelist. The Eastern Question generally
refers to historical developments between the Russo-Turkish war of
1768-74 and the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne that raised the question of
what should become of the Ottoman Empire, then in decline. And it
is precisely both an issue Disraeli had always held dear and which
his biographers concur in considering as ‘the key to understanding
his complex personality, his political ideas, and his foreign policy’
[ix]. Kovic convincingly posits that although Disraeli’s management
of the 1875-1878 Eastern crisis has retained the attention of several
biographers and of Robert W. Seton-Watson – who published Disraeli,
Gladstone and the Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party
Politics in 1935 –, the impact of personal and political
events in Disraeli’s life prior to his return to power in 1874
on his general vision of the Eastern Question has largely been overlooked
and yet is primordial.
Kovic’s
Disraeli and the Eastern Question is an adapted translation
for Anglophone readers of the Serbian edition, published by CLIO in
2007, and originated as a PhD dissertation defended at the University
of Belgrade in 2006, where the author now teaches history. The author’s
choice of Disraeli is not simply fascination for probably one of the
most cryptic, multi-faceted central Victorian political figures –
something the front cover wonderfully illustrates. It also results
from the desire to offer readers ‘a whole-sale reconstruction
of Disraeli’s understanding of the Eastern Question’ [xi],
which had not really been attempted since 1935. Kovic points out that,
by contrast, the role of Disraeli’s arch-rival, Gladstone, in
the Eastern crisis of the 1870s has already been examined in two landmark
monographs: Richard T. Shannon’s Gladstone and the Bulgarian
Agitation 1876 (1963) and Ann P. Saab’s Reluctant Icon:
Gladstone, Bulgaria and the Working Classes, 1876-1878 (1991).
More than an exclusively political biography, Kovic pleads for the
combination of four major historical approaches – biography,
intellectual history, British domestic political history and diplomatic
history – in order to fully assess Disraeli’s career-long
engagement with the Eastern Question. With Disraeli and the Eastern
Question, Kovic is thus walking in the steps of these few historians
(including Shannon and Saab) who had tried to relate the Eastern Question
not only to British diplomatic history as Seton-Watson, M.S. Anderson
or Richard Millman had tried to do, but to British national history.
Kovic’s
work is divided into three parts of very unequal length, which are
organised chronologically.
In
Part 2, Kovic shows how at the time of the ‘Bulgarian atrocities’
(committed by Ottoman irregulars in 1876), this realist view was criticised
by the British public and especially by his arch-rival, Liberal leader,
William E. Gladstone, as being cynical, unchristian and potentially
criminal. He also looks into the unease Disraeli’s view of the
Eastern Question caused amongst his Cabinet, especially at the time
of the Russo-Turkish War in 1877-8 when Lord Carnarvon and Lord Salisbury
were on the verge of resigning and favouring the ‘policy of
the crusade’ – i.e. encouraging Balkan nationalists supported
by Russia to secede from the Ottoman Empire – over Disraeli’s
‘imperial policy of England’, which potentially required
Britain’s entry into war alongside the Sultan [198]. In early
1878, thanks to the resignations of Lord Carnarvon and subsequently
of Lord Derby (his Foreign Secretary) and the realignment of Lord
Salisbury with Disraeli’s personal conviction that the maintenance
of the balance of power in the East could, if need be, include war
threats against Russia and circumstantial alliances with possibly
the other two members of the Dreikaiserbund (Germany and
Austria-Hungary), the Conservative Premier was able to impose himself
and restore some sort of stability within his government, thereby
brushing away the risk of a vote of no confidence by anti-war members
of the Opposition, led by Gladstone. Kovic rightly points out that
such a tour de force required quasi(?)-‘dictatorial powers’
[202] on the part of Disraeli. For instance, Disraeli did not refrain
from tricking the Queen into believing she had leeway in making foreign
policy decisions – he even let her in on the Eastern Question
diplomatic confidential secrets, sometimes at the expense of Lord
Derby –, in order to have her convince some of the more reluctant
ministers to change their views (Lord Cairns and Lord Salisbury) or
leave (Lord Carnarvon and Lord Derby). Part 2 concludes with the joint
achievement of Disraeli and Salisbury (promoted Foreign Secretary
after Derby stepped down from office) at the time of the Congress
of Berlin in July 1878. Kovic intimates how their ‘peace with
honour’ [247] met with mixed reactions back in Britain, especially
the news of Britain’s occupation of Cyprus, which thrilled die-hard
jingoists (mostly Conservatives) to the great dismay of those, like
Gladstone, who vilified the expansion of the British Empire.
Part
3 is much shorter, being only 28 pages long (with the conclusion)
whereas Parts 1 and 2 respectively totalled 80 and 208 pages. Part
3 covers the period after the signature of the Treaty of Berlin (in
July 1878) to Disraeli’s death in 1881 and is devoted to the
latter’s ‘temptations in later life’.
The
task before Kovic was daunting from more perspectives than one. It
has already been noted that the author’s main subject, Disraeli
(often nicknamed ‘Dizzy’), is in itself a real challenge
given the countless biographies that have already been published and
the eccentricity of the figure which, in Dizzy’s own days, puzzled
his contemporaries. Of course, the Eastern Question is a very complex
one to relate, so much so that Gladstone even called a ‘hydra’
because of its many heads. At the international level, it involved
European diplomacy, Ottoman history (including that of administrative
reforms initiated during the Tanzimât era) and the burgeoning
of sometimes competitive nationalist aspirations in the Ottoman Empire
(especially in the Balkans, with Bosnia, Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Serbia,
Romania, Albania, Montenegro, Dalmatia and Greece). Kovic offers a
very clear overview of the Eastern Question, enriched with the
minutiae of British diplomatic dealings with the Great Powers.
The author also wonderfully puts diplomatic intricacies into perspective
with the way foreign politics was conducted in the Victorian era and
with the tensions and debates in British Victorian political circles
(including the issue of the political leadership of both the Conservative
and the Liberal Parties and also the question of the nature of British
foreign policy and imperialism). Undeniably, the whole study gains
greatly from the presence of many, clear headings and subheadings,
which enable readers to navigate the troubled waters of the Eastern
Question without losing track of the first term of Kovic’s title,
Disraeli. The strictly chronological pattern of the study inevitably
generates a few – perhaps unavoidable - repetitions, but is
a fairly logical choice for what remains a political and ‘intellectual
biography’ [back cover] and advantageously serves to show how
Disraeli adapted to circumstances, while still under the global influence
of landmark moments of his young age. The synthetic conclusion brings
it home that Disraeli’s early attitude to the East and the Eastern
Question is ‘essential for understanding his complex persona
and the most crucial period of his career’ [back cover].
One
regret however would be that Part 3 does not explore in more detail
the link between the Eastern Question, the Egyptian and Afghan ones
and Disraeli’s fall from power after Gladstone’s scathing
attacks against the Conservative Premier’s so-called mismanagement
of Eastern crises (be they Balkan, Cypriot, Egyptian or Afghan) in
his Midlothian campaigns of 1879-80. This is all the more frustrating
that the first parts are powerfully argued and display a precise knowledge
of a variety of primary sources (both published and unpublished) and
secondary ones. Kovic rightly concedes that previous historians and
biographers have barely mentioned at all Disraeli’s dealings
with the Eastern Question after the signature of the Berlin Treaty,
but this triggers the interest of readers all the more...
This
is a minor point however as Disraeli and the Eastern Question
makes thought-provoking reading for anyone deeply interested in this
very complex issue and reminds its readers that Disraeli’s understanding
of the Eastern Question has immense bearing on his conception of foreign
and imperial policy as being first and foremost Realpolitik.
© 2011 Stéphanie Prévost & GRAAT On-Line
In Part 1, which is entitled ‘Disraeli, the Balkans, and the
Ottoman Empire (1804-1874)’, ‘biography intersects with
intellectual history’ [viii] in order to bring out the various
circumstances which shaped Disraeli’s understanding of the Eastern
Question before he had to handle the 1875-1878 Eastern crisis. There,
Kovic particularly insists on the importance of his foreign and Jewish
ancestry, of his father’s readings (especially Machiavelli)
and of his quest for origins, which, taken together with his Romantic
leanings and fascination for Lord Byron, coloured his vision of the
East (especially the Holy Land) as made visible in his notes on his
Grand Tour undertaken in 1830-1. To Kovic, these elements provided
Disraeli with two contradictory ways of looking at the Eastern Question:
Realpolitik and Romantic enthusiasm for nationalist movements,
the latter in particular pervading several of the novels Disraeli
published in the very first days of his political career: Contarini
Fleming (1832); Alroy (1833); The Rise of Iskander
(1833); Coningsby (1844) and Tancred (1847). Kovic
suggests that the tension between both conceptions heightened in the
late 1840s as Disraeli progressively moved away from the Tory radicalism
of his early days (and away from the Young England movement) to be
a full-fledged member of the Conservative party. The last chapter
of this first part, devoted to Disraeli’s viewpoint on Britain’s
involvement in the Crimean War in early 1854, paves the way for Parts
2 (‘Lord Beaconsfield and the Eastern Crisis [of] 1875-1878’)
and 3 (‘Temptations in Later Life’). Indeed, Kovic rightly
contends that Disraeli’s conviction that the war with Russia
could have been avoided if decisive diplomacy had been used together
with the threat of force would be prominent in his mind at the time
of the 1875-1878 crisis. Kovic underlines that Disraeli holds this
view all the dearer that it was also propounded by the Whig Palmerston,
whom he admired and rivalled. The author goes further still by suggesting
that Disraeli’s support of the Ottoman Empire was pragmatic
rather than betraying systematic Turcophile sympathy: he cogently
demonstrates that although the Conservative Premier was convinced
that the ‘sick man of Europe’ (as the Ottoman Empire was
known in those days) was on its last legs, he still felt that in the
face of the Bosnian, Herzegovinian and Bulgarian uprisings against
their suzerain (Sultan Abdul Aziz) in 1875-6, British interests in
the East (especially the road to India, now via Suez) were better
protected by supporting the decaying Ottoman regime rather than hastening
its fall and whetting greedy Russia’s appetite for Constantinople,
the Straits and potentially the Balkans.